498A-Dowry Cases in Delhi India
Family
members of a man should not be
implicated in a dowry Cases
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1674 OF 2012
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.
10547/2010)
Geeta Mehrotra & Anr.
..Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. .
Respondents
J U D G M E N T
GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.
1. This appeal by special leave in
which we granted leave has been filed by the appellants against the order dated
6.9.2010 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Crl.
Miscellaneous Application No.22714/2007 whereby the High Court had been pleased
to dispose of the application moved by the appellants under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
for quashing the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance against the
appellants under Sections 498A/323/504/506 IPC read with Section 3/4 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act with an observation that the question of territorial
jurisdiction cannot be properly decided by the High Court under Section 482
Cr.P.C. for want of adequate facts. It was, therefore, left open to the
appellants to move the trial court for dropping the proceedings on the ground
of lack of territorial jurisdiction. The High Court however granted interim
protection to the appellants by directing the authorities not to issue coercive
process against the appellants until disposal of the application filed by the
appellants with a further direction to the trial court to dispose of the
application if moved by the appellants, within a period of two months from the
date of moving the application. The application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was
thus disposed of by the High Court.
2. The appellants in spite of the
liberty granted to them to move the trial court, have filed this appeal for
quashing the proceedings which had been initiated on the basis of a case lodged
by the respondent No.2 Smt. Shipra Mehrotra (earlier known as Shipra Seth)
against her husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law and
sister-in-law. This appeal has been preferred by the sister-in- law, who is
appellant No.1 and brother-in-law of the complainant, who is appellant No.2.
3. The case emerges out of the first
information report lodged by respondent No.2 Smt. Shipra Mehrotra under
Sections 498A/323/504/506 IPC read with Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act bearing F.I.R.No. 52/2004. The F.I.R. was registered at Mahila Thana
Daraganj, Allahabad wherein the complainant alleged that she was married to
Shyamji Mehrotra s/o Balbir Saran who was living at Eros Garden, Charmswood
Village, Faridabad, Suraj Kund Road at Faridabad Haryana as per the Hindu
marriage rites and customs. Prior to marriage the complainant and her family
members were told by Shyamji Mehrotra and his elder brother Ramji Mehrotra who
is appellant No.2 herein and their mother Smt. Kamla Mehrotra and her sister
Geeta Mehrotra who is appellant No.1 herein that Shyamji is employed as a Team
Leader in a top I.T. Company in Chennai and is getting salary of Rs.45,000/-
per month. After negotiation between the parents of the complainant and the
accused parties, the marriage of the complainant Shipra Seth (later Shipra
Mehrotra) and Shyamji Mehrotra was performed after which the
respondent-complainant left for the house of her in- laws.
4. It was stated that the atmosphere
in the house was peaceful for sometime but soon after the wedding, when all the
relatives left, the maid who cooked meals was first of all paid-off by the
aforesaid four persons who then told the complainant that from now onwards, the
complainant will have to prepare food for the family. In addition, the above
mentioned people started taunting and scolding her on trivial issues. The
complainant also came to know that Shyamji was not employed anywhere and always
stayed in the house. Shyamji gradually took away all the money which the complainant
had with her and then told her that her father had not given dowry properly,
therefore, she should get Rupees five lakhs from her father in order to enable
him to start business, because he was not getting any job. When the complainant
clearly declined and stated that she will not ask her parents for money,
Shyamji, on instigation of other accused-family members, started beating her
occasionally. To escape every day torture and financial status of the family,
the complainant took up a job in a Call Centre at Convergys on 17.2.2003 where
the complainant had to do night shifts due to which she used to come back home
at around 3 a.m. in the morning. Just on her return from work, the household
people started playing bhajan cassettes after which she had to getup at 7’o
clock in the morning to prepare and serve food to all the members in the
family. Often on falling asleep in the morning, Shyamji, Kamla Devi and Geeta
Mehrotra tortured the complainant every day mentally and physically. Ramji
Mehrotra often provoked the other three family members to torture and often
used to make the complainant feel sad by making inappropriate statements about
the complainant and her parents. Her husband Shyamji also took away the salary
from the complainant.
5. After persistent efforts, Shyamji
finally got a job in Chennai and he went to Chennai for the job in May, 2003.
But, it is alleged that there was no change in his behaviour even after going
to Chennai. The complainant often called him on phone to talk to him but he always
did irrelevant conversation. He never spoke properly with the complainant
whenever he visited home and often used to hurl filthy abuses. The complainant
states that she often wept and tolerated the tortures of the accused persons
for a long time but did not complain to her family members, as that would have
made them feel sad. At last, when the complainant realized that even her life
was in danger, she was compelled to tell everything to her father on phone who
was very upset on hearing her woes. On 15.7.2003 complainant heard some
conversation of her mother-in-law and sister-in-law from which it appeared to
her that they want to kill the complainant in the night only. Thereupon the
complainant apprised her father of the situation on phone to which her father
replied that he will call back her father-in-law and she should go with him
immediately and he will come in the morning. The father-in-law Satish Dhawan
and his wife who were living in NOIDA thereafter came in the night and somehow
took the complainant to their home who also came to know of everything. The
complainant’s father and brother later went to her matrimonial home on
16.7.2003. On seeing her father and brother, Kamla Mehrotra and Geeta Mehrotra
started speaking loudly and started saying that Shyamji would be coming by the
evening and so he should come in the evening for talking to them. Her father
and brother then went away from there. That very day, her husband Shyamji and
brother-in-law Ramji also reached home. On reaching there, Shyamji abused her
on phone and told her to send her father.
6. When father and brother of the
complainant went home in the evening, they were also insulted by all the four
and video camera and tape were played and in the end they were told that they
should leave from here. Insulted, they came back from there and then came back
to Allahabad with the complainant. For many days the complainant and her family
members hoped that the situation would improve if the matter was resolved. Many
times other people tried to persuade the in – laws but to no avail. Her brother
went to their house to talk to her in – laws but it came to his knowledge that
the in – laws had changed their house. After much effort, they came to know
that the father-in- law and mother-in-law started living at B-39, Brahma
cooperative group housing society, block 7, sector-7, Dwarka, Delhi. On
19.09.04 evening, her father talked to Kamla Mehrotra and Geeta Mehrotra
regarding the complainant using bad words and it was said that if her daughter
came there she will be kicked out. After some time Shyamji rang up at
complainant’s home but on hearing the complainant’s voice, he told her
abusively that now she should not come his way and she should tell her father
not to phone him in future. At approximately 10:30 pm in the night Ramji’s
phone came to the complainant’s home. He used bad words while talking to her
father and in the end said that he had got papers prepared in his defence and
he may do whatever he could but if he could afford to give Rs.10 lakhs then it
should be conveyed after which he will reconsider the matter. If the girl was
sent to his place without money, then even her dead body will not be found.
7. On hearing these talks of the
accused, the complainant believed that her in-laws will not let the complainant
enter their home without taking ten lakhs and if the complainant went there on
her own, she will not be safe. Hence, she lodged the report wherein she prayed
that the SHO Daraganj should be ordered to do the needful after registering the
case against the accused Shyam Mehrotra, Ramji Mehrotra, Kamla Mehrotra and
Geeta Mehrotra. Thus, in substance, the complainant related the bickering at
her matrimonial home which made her life miserable in several ways and
compelled her to leave her in- law’s place in order to live with her father
where she lodged a police case as stated hereinbefore.
8. On the basis of the complaint, the
investigating authorities at P.S. Daraganj, Allahabad started investigation of
the case and thereafter the police submitted chargesheet against the appellants
and other family members of the complainant’s husband.
9. Hence, the appellants who are
sister and brother of the complainant’s husband filed petition under Section
482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of the chargesheet and the entire proceedings pending
in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Court No.IV, Allahabad, inter-
alia, on the ground that FIR has been lodged with mala fide intentions to
harass the appellants and that no case was made out against the appellants as
well as other family members. But the principal ground of challenge to the FIR
was that the incident although was alleged to have taken place at Faridabad and
the investigation should have been done there only, the complainant with mala
fide intention in connivance with the father of the complainant, got the
investigating officer to record the statements by visiting Ghaziabad which was
beyond his territorial jurisdiction and cannot be construed as legal and proper
investigation. It was also alleged that the father of the complainant got the
arrest warrant issued through George Town Police Station, Allahabad, in spite
of the cause of action having arisen at Allahabad.
10. This appeal has been preferred by
Kumari Geeta Mehrotra i.e. the sister of the complainant’s husband and Ramji
Mehrotra i.e. the elder brother of the complainant’s husband assailing the
order of the High Court and it was submitted that the Hon’ble High Court ought
to have appreciated that the complainant who had already obtained an ex-parte
decree of divorce, is pursuing the present case through her father with the
sole purpose to unnecessarily harass the appellants to extract money from them
as all efforts of mediation had failed.
11. However, the grounds of challenge
before this Court to the order of the High Court, inter alia is that the High
Court had failed to appreciate that the investigation had been done by the
authority without following due process of law which also lacked territorial
jurisdiction. The relevant documents/parcha diary for deciding the territorial
jurisdiction had been overlooked as the FIR has been lodged at Allahabad
although the cause of action of the entire incident is alleged to have taken
place at Faridabad (Haryana). It was, therefore, submitted that the
investigating authorities of the Allahabad have traversed beyond the
territorial limits which is clearly an abuse of the process of law and the High
Court has failed to exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in
the facts and circumstances of this case and allowed the proceedings to go on
before the trial court although it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.
12. It was further averred that the
High Court had failed to examine the facts of the FIR to see whether the facts
stated in the FIR constitute any prima facie case making out an offence against
the sister-in-law and brother-in-law of the complainant and whether there was
at all any material to constitute an offence against the appellants and their
family members. Attention of this Court was further invited to the
contradictions in the statement of the complainant and her father which
indicate material contradictions indicating that the complainant and her father
have concocted the story to implicate the appellants as well as all their
family members in a criminal case merely with a mala fide intention to settle
her scores and extract money from the family of her ex-husband Shyamji Mehrotra
and his family members.
13. On a perusal of the complaint and
other materials on record as also analysis of the arguments advanced by the
contesting parties in the light of the settled principles of law reflected in a
catena of decisions, it is apparent that the High Court has not applied its
mind on the question as to whether the case was fit to be quashed against the
appellants and has merely disposed of the petition granting liberty to the
appellants to move the trial court and raise contentions on the ground as to
whether it has territorial jurisdiction to continue with the trial in the light
of the averment that no part of the cause of action had arisen at Allahabad and
the entire incident even as per the FIR had taken place at Faridabad.
14. The High Court further overlooked
the fact that during the pendency of this case, the complainant-respondent No.2
has obtained an ex-parte decree of divorce against her husband Shyamji Mehrotra
and the High Court failed to apply its mind whether any case could be held to
have been made out against Kumari Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra, who are
the unmarried sister and elder brother of the complainant’s ex-husband. Facts
of the FIR even as it stands indicate that although a prima facie case against
the husband Shyamji Mehrotra and some other accused persons may or may not be
constituted, it surely appears to be a case where no ingredients making out a
case against the unmarried sister of the accused Shyamji Mehrotra and his
brother Ramji Mehrotra appear to be existing for even when the complainant came
to her in-law’s house after her wedding, she has alleged physical and mental
torture by stating in general that she had been ordered to do household
activities of cooking meals for the whole family. But there appears to be no
specific allegation against the sister and brother of the complainant’s husband
as to how they could be implicated into the mutual bickering between the
complainant and her husband Shyamji Mehrotra including his parents.
15. Under the facts and circumstance
of similar nature in the case of Ramesh vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2005) SCC (Crl.) 735 at 738 allegations were made
in a complaint against the husband, the in-laws, husband’s brother and sister
who were all the petitioners before the High Court wherein after registration
of the F.I.R. and investigation, the charge sheet was filed by the Inspector of
Police in the court of Judicial Magistrate III, Trichy. Thereupon, the learned
magistrate took cognizance of the offence and issued warrants against the
appellants on 13.2.2002. Four of the accused-appellants were arrested and
released on bail by the magistrate at Mumbai. The appellants had filed petition
under Section 482, Cr.P.C. before the Madras High Court for quashing the
proceedings in complaint case on the file of the Judicial Magistrate III,
Trichy. The High Court by the impugned order dismissed the petition observing
that the grounds raised by the petitioners were all subject matters to be heard
by the trial court for better appreciation after conducting full trial as the
High Court was of the view that it was only desirable to dismiss the criminal
original petition and the same was also dismissed. However, the High Court had
directed the Magistrate to dispense with the personal attendance of the
appellants.
16. Aggrieved by the order of the
Madras High Court dismissing the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the
special leave petition was filed in this Court giving rise to the appeals
therein where threefold contentions were raised viz., (i) that the allegations
are frivolous and without any basis; (ii) even according to the FIR, no
incriminating acts were done within the jurisdiction of Trichy Police Station
and the court at Trichy and, therefore, the learned magistrate lacked
territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence and (iii) taking
cognizance of the alleged offence at that stage was barred under Section 468(1)
Cr.P.C. as it was beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section
468(2) Cr.P.C. Apart from the subsequent two contentions, it was urged that the
allegations under the FIR do not make out any offence of which cognizance could
be taken.
17. Their Lordships of the Supreme
Court in this matter had been pleased to hold that the bald allegations made
against the sister in law by the complainant appeared to suggest the anxiety of
the informant to rope in as many of the husband’s relatives as possible. It was
held that neither the FIR nor the charge sheet furnished the legal basis for
the magistrate to take cognizance of the offences alleged against the
appellants. The learned Judges were pleased to hold that looking to the
allegations in the FIR and the contents of the charge sheet, none of the
alleged offences under Section 498 A, 406 and Section 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act were made against the married sister of the complainant’s
husband who was undisputedly not living with the family of the complainant’s
husband. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were pleased to hold that the
High Court ought not to have relegated the sister in law to the ordeal of
trial. Accordingly, the proceedings against the appellants were quashed and the
appeal was allowed.
18. In so far as the plea of
territorial jurisdiction is concerned, it is no doubt true that the High Court
was correct to the extent that the question of territorial jurisdiction could
be decided by the trial court itself. But this ground was just one of the
grounds to quash the proceedings initiated against the appellants under Section
482 Cr.P.C. wherein it was also alleged that no prima facie case was made out
against the appellants for initiating the proceedings under the Dowry
Prohibition Act and other provisions of the IPC. The High Court has failed to
exercise its jurisdiction in so far as the consideration of the case of the
appellants are concerned, who are only brother and sister of the complainant’s
husband and are not alleged even by the complainant to have demanded dowry from
her. The High Court, therefore, ought to have considered that even if the trial
court at Allahabad had the jurisdiction to hold the trial, the question still
remained as to whether the trial against the brother and sister of the husband
was fit to be continued and whether that would amount to abuse of the process
of the court.
19. Coming to the facts of this case,
when the contents of the FIR is perused, it is apparent that there are no
allegations against Kumari Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra except casual
reference of their names who have been included in the FIR but mere casual
reference of the names of the family members in a matrimonial dispute without
allegation of active involvement in the matter would not justify taking
cognizance against them overlooking the fact borne out of experience that there
is a tendency to involve the entire family members of the household in the
domestic quarrel taking place in a matrimonial dispute specially if it happens
soon after the wedding.
20. It would be relevant at this
stage to take note of an apt observation of this Court recorded in the matter
of G.V. Rao vs. L.H.V. Prasad
& Ors. reported in (2000) 3 SCC 693 wherein also in a
matrimonial dispute, this Court had held that the High Court should have
quashed the complaint arising out of a matrimonial dispute wherein all family
members had been roped into the matrimonial litigation which was quashed and
set aside. Their Lordships observed therein with which we entirely agree that:
“there has been an outburst of
matrimonial dispute in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, main
purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live
peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume
serious proportions resulting in heinous crimes in which elders of the family
are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and
brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as
accused in the criminal case. There are many reasons which need not be
mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties
may ponder over their defaults and terminate the disputes amicably by mutual
agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and
years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in
chasing their cases in different courts.”
The view taken by the judges in this
matter was that the courts would not encourage such disputes.
21. In yet another case reported in
AIR 2003 SC 1386 in the matter of B.S. Joshi & Ors. vs. State of
Haryana & Anr. it was observed that there is no doubt that the object
of introducing Chapter XXA containing Section 498A in the Indian Penal Code was
to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her
husband. Section 498A was added with a view to punish the husband and his
relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her relatives to satisfy
unlawful demands of dowry. But if the proceedings are initiated by the wife
under Section 498A against the husband and his relatives and subsequently she
has settled her disputes with her husband and his relatives and the wife and
husband agreed for mutual divorce, refusal to exercise inherent powers by the
High Court would not be proper as it would prevent woman from settling earlier.
Thus for the purpose of securing the ends of justice quashing of FIR becomes
necessary, Section 320 Cr.P.C. would not be a bar to the exercise of power of
quashing. It would however be a different matter depending upon the facts and
circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not to exercise such a power.
22. In the instant matter, when the
complainant and her husband are divorced as the complainant-wife secured an
ex-parte decree of divorce, the same could have weighed with the High Court to
consider whether proceeding initiated prior to the divorce decree was fit to be
pursued in spite of absence of specific allegations at least against the
brother and sister of the complainant’s husband and whether continuing with
this proceeding could not have amounted to abuse of the process of the court.
The High Court, however, seems not to have examined these aspects carefully and
have thus side- tracked all these considerations merely on the ground that the
territorial jurisdiction could be raised only before the magistrate conducting
the trial.
23. In the instant case, the question
of territorial jurisdiction was just one of the grounds for quashing the
proceedings along with the other grounds and, therefore, the High Court should
have examined whether the prosecution case was fit to be quashed on other
grounds or not. At this stage, the question also crops up whether the matter is
fit to be remanded to the High Court to consider all these aspects. But in
matters arising out of a criminal case, fresh consideration by remanding the
same would further result into a protracted and vexatious proceeding which is
unwarranted as was held by this Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of Tamil Nadu (supra) that such a course of remand would be unnecessary and
inexpedient as there was no need to prolong the controversy. The facts in this
matter on this aspect was although somewhat different since the complainant had
lodged the complaint after seven years of delay, yet in the instant matter the
factual position remains that the complaint as it stands lacks ingredients
constituting the offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition
Act against the appellants who are sister and brother of the complainant’s
husband and their involvement in the whole incident appears only by way of a
casual inclusion of their names. Hence, it cannot be overlooked that it would
be total abuse of the process of law if we were to remand the matter to the
High Court to consider whether there were still any material to hold that the
trial should proceed against them in spite of absence of prima facie material
constituting the offence alleged against them.
24. However, we deem it appropriate
to add by way of caution that we may not be misunderstood so as to infer that
even if there are allegation of overt act indicating the complicity of the members
of the family named in the FIR in a given case, cognizance would be unjustified
but what we wish to emphasize by highlighting is that, if the FIR as it stands
does not disclose specific allegation against accused more so against the
co-accused specially in a matter arising out of matrimonial bickering, it would
be clear abuse of the legal and judicial process to mechanically send the named
accused in the FIR to undergo the trial unless of course the FIR discloses
specific allegations which would persuade the court to take cognisance of the
offence alleged against the relatives of the main accused who are prima facie
not found to have indulged in physical and mental torture of the
complainant-wife. It is the well settled principle laid down in cases too
numerous to mention, that if the FIR did not disclose the commission of an
offence, the court would be justified in quashing the proceedings preventing
the abuse of the process of law. Simultaneously, the courts are expected to
adopt a cautious approach in matters of quashing specially in cases of
matrimonial dispute whether the FIR in fact discloses commission of an offence
by the relatives of the principal accused or the FIR prima facie discloses a
case of over-implication by involving the entire family of the accused at the
instance of the complainant, who is out to settle her scores arising out of the
teething problem or skirmish of domestic bickering while settling down in her
new matrimonial surrounding.
25. In the case at hand, when the
brother and unmarried sister of the principal accused Shyamji Mehrotra
approached the High Court for quashing the proceedings against them,
inter-alia, on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction as also on the
ground that no case was made out against them under Sections 498A,/323/504/506
including Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, it was the legal duty of
the High Court to examine whether there were prima facie material against the
appellants so that they could be directed to undergo the trial, besides the
question of territorial jurisdiction. The High Court seems to have overlooked
all the pleas that were raised and rejected the petition on the solitary ground
of territorial jurisdiction giving liberty to the appellants to approach the
trial court.
26. The High Court in our considered
opinion appear to have missed that assuming the trial court had territorial
jurisdiction, it was still left to be decided whether it was a fit case to send
the appellants for trial when the FIR failed to make out a prima facie case
against them regarding the allegation of inflicting physical and mental torture
to the complainant demanding dowry from the complainant. Since the High Court
has failed to consider all these aspects, this Court as already stated
hereinbefore, could have remitted the matter to the High Court to consider
whether a case was made out against the appellants to proceed against them. But
as the contents of the FIR does not disclose specific allegation against the
brother and sister of the complainant’s husband except casual reference of
their names, it would not be just to direct them to go through protracted
procedure by remanding for consideration of the matter all over again by the
High Court and make the unmarried sister of the main accused and his elder
brother to suffer the ordeal of a criminal case pending against them specially
when the FIR does not disclose ingredients of offence under Sections
498A/323/504/506, IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
27. We, therefore, deem it just and legally
appropriate to quash the proceedings initiated against the appellants Geeta
Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra as the FIR does not disclose any material which
could be held to be constituting any offence against these two appellants.
Merely by making a general allegation that they were also involved in physical
and mental torture of the complainant-respondent No.2 without mentioning even a
single incident against them as also the fact as to how they could be motivated
to demand dowry when they are only related as brother and sister of the
complainant’s husband, we are pleased to quash and set aside the criminal
proceedings in so far as these appellants are concerned and consequently the
order passed by the High Court shall stand overruled. The appeal accordingly is
allowed.
……………………………J
(T.S. Thakur)
……………………………J
(Gyan Sudha Misra)
New Delhi,
October 17, 2012
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